Two recent critics of Mill's qualitative hedonism, Michael Hauskeller and Kristin Schaupp, argue that Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures was largely unsuccessful. They allege that Mill failed to demonstrate that some pleasures are lexically preferred to others, and indeed that this can be shown false by the fact that most people would not renounce supposedly lower pleasures, such as chocolate or sex, even for greater amounts of higher pleasures, such as reading or opera. I respond that many of these criticisms rest on uncharitable assumptions or interpretations of Mill's position. We need not suppose that Mill was even trying to do the things he supposedly failed to do. However, considering these objections may lead us to a more plausible interpretation of Mill's views, according to which the quality of pleasures, along with their quantity, contributes towards happiness. There is no need to suppose that ‘higher pleasures’ must be lexically preferred to lower ones, or even to be dogmatic about which pleasures are higher.

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近期对密尔定性享乐主义的批评

最近对密尔定性享乐主义的两位批评家迈克尔·豪斯凯勒和克里斯汀·肖普认为，密尔对高级快乐和低级快乐的区分在很大程度上是不成功的。他们声称，穆勒未能证明某些快乐在词汇上比其他快乐更受欢迎，事实上，这可以证明是错误的，因为大多数人不会放弃所谓的低级快乐，例如巧克力或性，即使是为了更多的高级快乐，如阅读或歌剧。我回应说，这些批评中的许多都建立在对穆勒立场的无情假设或解释之上。我们不需要假设穆勒甚至试图做他认为没有做的事情。然而，考虑到这些反对意见，我们可能会对穆勒的观点做出更合理的解释，根据该观点，快乐的质量，连同它们的数量，有助于幸福。没有必要假设“高级快乐”在词汇上一定比低级快乐更受欢迎，甚至没有必要对哪种快乐更高一级感到教条。