Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.

中文翻译：

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休谟论信念和辩护性解释

休谟对信仰的解释被理解为受到据称不相容的动机的启发，一个是描述性的并表达了休谟的自然主义，另一个是规范性的并表达了休谟的认识论目标。这种理解假设了这些元素不同的特定方式：我反对的假设。我认为休谟对信仰的解释性自然主义方面与规范性认识论方面并不矛盾。相反，至少对于休谟详细讨论的信念形成的一些核心案例，S 开始相信p可以用一种证明 S 相信的方式来解释p.