Individuals (like the Earth or a biological species) are often the subject of generalizations of various special sciences. The traditional argument is that there can't be laws about such individuals, since the law statements would have to contain local predicates (refer essentially to a particular time, place, object, or event). Marc Lange argues that, despite local predication, there can be laws about individuals. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there can be no such laws – not because of local predication, but because the laws would discriminate among material systems on non-qualitative grounds. I rely on the principle that qualitatively identical systems under one set of laws must evolve in the same manner. If there could be laws about individuals, nothing would guarantee that the principle is satisfied. My argument is illustrated by a thought experiment inspired by Strawson's massive reduplication argument.

中文翻译：

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自然法则和个人

个体（如地球或生物物种）通常是各种特殊科学概括的主题。传统的论点是不能有关于这些人的法律，因为法律声明必须包含本地谓词（主要指特定的时间、地点、对象或事件）。Marc Lange 认为，尽管有当地的预测，但可以有关于个人的法律。相反，本文认为不可能有这样的法律——不是因为当地的预测，而是因为法律会在非质量基础上区分物质系统。我依赖这样一个原则，即在一组法律下质量相同的系统必须以相同的方式发展。如果可以有关于个人的法律，那么没有什么可以保证该原则得到满足。