In this article, we analyse one of the most famous recent thought experiments in philosophy, namely Donald Davidson’s Swampman. Engaging recent commentators on Davidson’s Swampman as well as analysing the spatio-temporal conditions of the thought-experiment, we will show how the ‘experiment’ inevitably fails. For it doesn’t take seriously some of its own defining characteristics: crucially, Swampman’s creation of a sudden in a place distinct from Davidson’s. Instead of denigrating philosophical thought-experiments per se, our analysis points towards considering thought-experiments in a different sense: imaginary scenarios helpfully self-deconstructing rather than constituting substantive philosophical resources.

中文翻译：

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为什么“沼泽人”甚至不会想像是戴维森：在戴维森的魔术戏法的时空基础上

在本文中，我们分析了哲学领域最近最著名的思想实验之一，即唐纳德·戴维森的《沼泽人》。与戴维森的《沼泽人》的近期评论员互动，并分析思想实验的时空条件，我们将展示“实验”如何不可避免地失败。因为它并没有认真对待自己定义的某些特征：至关重要的是，Swampman在与Davidson截然不同的地方创作了一个突如其来的东西。我们的分析并非否定哲学思想实验本身，而是指向以不同的意义来考虑思想实验：假想场景有助于自我解构，而不是构成实质性的哲学资源。