There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude.

中文翻译：

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欲望和随意欲望的理由

关于欲望的规范性质存在未解决的冲突。一些作者将理性愿望与理性信念不同，认为这是一种规范上不受约束的态度。其他人则坚持认为，理性欲望似乎受制于若干一致性规范。本文认为，对意动规范性冲突的正确分析使我们承认欲望的内在和外在原因。如果合理，这一点有助于我们揭示欲望的一个基本方面，即我们不能随意欲望。然而，与信念不同，欲望可以毫无问题地容纳工具态度的概念。