An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa’s (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa’s wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws from both the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2012) as well as from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014; Carter 2017).

中文翻译：

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美德认识论、增强和控制

欧内斯特·索萨 (Ernest Sosa) (2017) 最近的想法的一个有趣方面是，增强的表现（例如，运动员在提高成绩的药物影响下的表现）达不到适应性，这是因为这种增强的表现并非来自真正的代理人的能力。在本文中，我详细探讨了这种思想在 Sosa 更广泛的美德认识论中的含义，重点是认知增强的案例。然后突出显示了某个难题，所提出的解决方案来自最近关于指导控制的道德责任文献（例如，Fischer 和 Ravizza 1998；Fischer 2012）以及心理哲学和认知科学中的认知整合工作（例如，Clark 和 Chalmers 1998；Clark 2008；Pritchard 2010；Palermos 2014；Carter 2017）。