Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.

中文翻译：

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对关于直觉的描述性证据主义的部分辩护：对莫利纽克斯的答复

Bernard Molyneux 提出了一些反对关于直觉的描述性证据主义的新论点。描述性证据主义是哲学家使用直觉作为证据的论点。Molyneux 的论点是： (1) 直觉假定支持的命题被视为具有某种程度和种类的确定性和正当性，这是他们无法从直觉中获得的；(2) 直觉以我们无法解释的方式影响我们，假设我们将它们视为证据；(3) 说服我们其内容的某些强烈直觉在正当化的背景下被视为不可接受的。本文针对这些新论点对描述性证据主义进行了部分辩护。