This article criticizes what it calls perspectival thought experiments, which require subjects to mentally simulate a perspective before making judgments from within it. Examples include Judith Thomson's violinist analogy, Philippa Foot's trolley problem, and Bernard Williams's Jim case. The article argues that advances in the philosophical and psychological study of empathy suggest that the simulative capacities required by perspectival thought experiments are all but impossible. These thought experiments require agents to consciously simulate necessarily unconscious features of subjectivity. To complete these experiments subjects must deploy theory-theoretical frameworks to predict what they think they would (or ought to) do. These outputs, however, systematically mislead subjects and are highly prone to error. They are of negligible probative value, and this bodes poorly for their continued use. The article ends with two suggestions. First, many thought experiments are not problematically perspectival. Second, it should be possible to carry out “in-their-shoes” perspectival thought experiments by off-loading simulations onto virtual environments into which philosophers place subjects.

中文翻译：

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同理心和思想实验的局限性

这篇文章批评了所谓的透视思维实验，它要求受试者在从内部做出判断之前在心理上模拟一个视角。例子包括朱迪思汤姆森的小提琴家类比、菲利帕富特的电车问题和伯纳德威廉姆斯的吉姆案。文章认为，同理心的哲学和心理学研究的进步表明，透视思维实验所需的模拟能力几乎是不可能的。这些思想实验要求代理有意识地模拟主观性的必然无意识特征。为了完成这些实验，受试者必须部署理论-理论框架来预测他们认为他们会（或应该）做什么。然而，这些输出会系统地误导受试者并且极易出错。它们的证明价值可以忽略不计，这预示着它们不利于继续使用。文章结尾有两个建议。首先，许多思想实验并不是有问题的透视。其次，应该可以通过将模拟卸载到哲学家放置对象的虚拟环境中来进行“穿鞋”的透视思想实验。