Consequentializers suggest that for all non‐consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within that theory’s account of value, consequentializers achieve a hollow victory. The resulting deontically equivalent consequentalist counterpart that results from absorbing originally non‐consequentialist moral intuitions can now no longer explain, in a theoretically illuminating way, why certain actions are wrong and others right. The paper explains why traditional consequentialist theories did not embrace the procedure, and sketches how consequentialism can consequentialize without incurring the same cost.

中文翻译：

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后果化的成本

结果论者认为，对于所有非结果论的道德理论，人们可以提出一个结果论的对应物，它产生与原始理论完全相同的道义输出。因此，所有的道德理论都可以“结果化”。本文认为，该程序虽然在技术上可行，但剥夺了结果主义在规范性论证方面的潜力。通过允许任何给定的结果主义道德理论的所谓反例被纳入该理论的价值解释中，结果论者取得了空洞的胜利。吸收最初非结果主义的道德直觉所产生的道义上等效的结果主义对应物，现在不能再以理论上具有启发性的方式解释为什么某些行为是错误的，而另一些行为是正确的。