I first argue that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. I then argue that although it’s easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then I attempt to articulate the truth that the deniers of philosophical progress are latching on to. Finally, I comment on the significance of the agreement and (potential) progress. 1. Philosophical Agreement Philosophers almost unanimously agree that there is precious little agreement amongst philosophers on philosophical matters. Against this, I think there are a great many substantive philosophical claims that we almost unanimously agree on, which fall into three groups: Reasons ones, Basic ones, and Conditional ones. Here is a list of Reasons claims that receive plenty of agreement amongst philosophers with the appropriate expertise: 1. Epistemicism faces a serious objection regarding how sharp meanings are fixed. 2. There are good reasons to think that truths about causation are closely connected to certain counterfactual truths and/or truths about laws of nature.

中文翻译：

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广泛的哲学共识和进步

我首先认为哲学家之间对哲学上的实质性主张有很多共识，这些主张分为三类。该协议表明存在重要的哲学进步。然后我争辩说，虽然列出几种潜在的哲学进步很容易，但要确定这种潜力是否是实际的则要困难得多。然后我试图阐明否定哲学进步的人所抓住的真理。最后，我评论了协议的重要性和（潜在的）进展。1. 哲学上的一致 哲学家们几乎一致同意，哲学家之间在哲学问题上几乎没有一致的意见。反对这一点，我认为有很多我们几乎一致同意的实质性哲学主张，它们分为三类：原因的、基本的和条件的。以下是在具有适当专业知识的哲学家中获得大量同意的理由声明列表： 1. 认识论面临着关于如何确定尖锐含义的严重反对意见。2. 有充分的理由认为关于因果关系的真理与某些反事实真理和/或关于自然法则的真理密切相关。