This article builds on David Velleman’s recent work on moral relativism to argue that Kant’s account of moral judgement is best read in a contextualist manner. More specifically, I argue that while for Kant the form of moral judgement is invariant, substantive moral judgements are nonetheless context-dependent. The same form of moral willing can give rise to divergent substantive judgements. To some limited extent, Kantian contextualism is a development out of Rawlsian constructivism. Yet while for constructivists the primary concern is with the derivation of generally valid principles of morality, Velleman’s Kant-inspired form of moral relativism demonstrates the indispensability to a Kantian approach of indexical reasons for action. I argue in turn that Velleman’s focus on the indexical nature of reasons for action must be supplemented by an account of agential reflexivity. The latter divides Kantian contextualism from Kantian relativism.

中文翻译：

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康德的语境主义

本文以大卫·维勒曼最近关于道德相对主义的著作为基础，认为康德对道德判断的解释最好以语境主义的方式阅读。更具体地说，我认为，尽管对康德来说，道德判断的形式是不变的，但实质性的道德判断仍然依赖于上下文。相同形式的道德意愿可以引起不同的实质性判断。在一定程度上，康德语境主义是罗尔斯建构主义的发展。然而，对于建构主义者来说，主要关注的是对普遍有效的道德原则的推导，而维勒曼受康德启发的道德相对主义形式表明，康德的行动索引理由方法是必不可少的。我反过来认为，Velleman 对行动理由的索引性质的关注必须由对能动反射性的说明来补充。后者将康德语境主义与康德相对主义分开。