In spite of its dominance, there are well-known problems with Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (MRE), as a method of justification in meta-ethics. One issue in particular has preoccupied commentators, namely, the capacity of this method to provide a convincing account of the objectivity of our moral beliefs. Call this the Lack-of-Objectivity Charge. One aim of this article is to examine the charge within the context of Rawls’s later philosophy, and I claim that the lack-of-objectivity charge remains unanswered. A second aim of this article is to examine the extent to which, despite Rawls’s express intention to avoid reliance on Kant’s moral philosophy, supplementing Rawls’s political constructivism with some Kantian elements, in particular Kant’s idea of a universal principle of right, not only addresses some of the issues raised by the lack-of-objectivity charge, but also does so without compromising the ability of the Rawlsian account to accommodate the pluralism of conceptions of the good, which he takes to be a fact of modern democracies. I argue for a revised justificatory methodology, which combines Rawls’s MRE and Kant’s Critical Method.

中文翻译：

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普世权利原则：形而上学、政治和冲突解决

尽管它占主导地位，但作为元伦理学中的一种辩护方法，罗尔斯的反思平衡方法（MRE）存在着众所周知的问题。评论家特别关注的一个问题是，这种方法能否对我们的道德信念的客观性提供令人信服的说明。将此称为缺乏客观性指控。本文的一个目的是在罗尔斯后期哲学的背景下审视这一指控，我声称缺乏客观性的指控仍未得到答复。本文的第二个目的是检验，尽管罗尔斯明确打算避免依赖康德的道德哲学，但在罗尔斯的政治建构主义中补充了一些康德元素，特别是康德关于普遍权利原则的思想，不仅解决了缺乏客观性指控所引发的一些问题，而且在这样做的同时又不损害罗尔斯解释适应善概念多元化的能力，他认为这是现代民主国家的一个事实。我主张一种修订的证明方法论，它结合了罗尔斯的 MRE 和康德的批判方法。