One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s composure and serve as a surrogate for reason. As such, Kant cannot recommend that we cultivate our emotions.

中文翻译：

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一颗足够好的心：康德与情感的培养

理解康德关于道德情感的观点的一种方法是栽培观. 根据这种观点，如果情绪得到适当的培养，情绪就会在康德道德中发挥作用。我对修炼观点持怀疑态度。首先，我表明支持修炼的文字证据是模棱两可的。然后，我提供了康德理论中的情绪解释，解释了他对情绪的正面和负面看法。情绪会吸引我们的注意力，因此它们既能扰乱心灵的平静，又能充当理性的替代品。因此，康德不建议我们培养情绪。