This paper gives an account of Kant’s concept of self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit), i.e. the satisfaction involved in the performance of moral action. This concept is vulnerable to an important objection: if moral action is satisfying, it might only ever be performed for the sake of this satisfaction. I explain Kant’s response to this objection and argue that it is superior to Francis Hutcheson’s response to a similar objection. I conclude by showing that two other notions of moral satisfaction in Kant’s moral philosophy, namely ‘sweet merit’ and the highest good, also avoid the objection.

中文翻译：

---

康德论道德满足

本文介绍了康德的概念自我满足(自我保护)，即道德行为的表现所涉及的满足感。这个概念很容易受到一个重要的反对：如果道德行为是令人满意的，那么它可能只会为了这种满足而执行。我解释了康德对这一反对意见的回应，并认为它优于弗朗西斯·哈奇森对类似反对意见的回应。最后，我表明康德道德哲学中的另外两个道德满足概念，即“甜蜜的功德”和最高善，也避免了反对意见。