Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents’ well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this thought into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they assume, in line with the tradition, that happiness is all there is to well-being – an assumption which, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Drawing on Kant’s underappreciated discussion of self-contentment, an intellectual analogue of happiness, I reconstruct an alternative account of morality’s relation to well-being. Morality is intrinsically related to well-being – and so is its own reward – not because it makes us happy but because it makes us self-contented.

中文翻译：

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道德是它自己的奖赏

传统上，康德伦理学被认为对代理人的福祉怀有敌意。最近的评论家正确地质疑了这一想法，但他们并没有将他们的挑战推得足够远。因为他们按照传统假设幸福就是幸福的全部——这一假设与康德关于道德的理性主义和关于幸福的经验主义相结合，暗示道德和幸福充其量是外在相关的。借助康德对自我满足（幸福的智力类比）的未被充分认识的讨论，我重构了关于道德与幸福关系的另一种解释。道德与幸福有着内在的联系——它本身的回报也是如此——不是因为它让我们快乐，而是因为它让我们自满。