This essay examines how Husserl stretches the bounds of his philosophy of meaning, according to which all propositions are categorical, to account for existential propositions, which seem to lack predicates. I examine Husserl’s counterintuitive conclusion that an existential proposition does possess a predicate and I explore his endeavor to pinpoint what that predicate is. This goal is accomplished in three stages. First, I examine Husserl’s standard theory of predication and categorial intuition from his 1901 Logical Investigations. Second, I show how Husserl imposes those 1901 insights to uncover the predicate of the existential proposition in unpublished manuscripts and lectures. He determines that the existential proposition predicates of the subject, that it corresponds to an actual object. This analysis reveals that Husserl’s descriptions of existential propositions from the late 1890s employed both static and genetic methodologies. In those texts, he carefully untangles and clarifies the co-enmeshed passive and active moments of consciousness and shows that the passive givenness of certain circumstances is the condition of possibility for our active verifying of propositions. Finally, I execute a critical assessment of Husserl’s thought to reveal that, while his insights about existential propositions are largely correct, they are augmented by re-construing them within the context of his mature philosophy. Only by renouncing his metaphysical neutrality and by accounting for intersubjectivity, can Husserl properly clarify existential propositions.

这篇文章探讨了胡塞尔如何扩展他的意义哲学的界限，根据该哲学，所有命题都是绝对的，以解释似乎缺乏谓词的存在命题。我研究了胡塞尔的反直觉结论，即存在命题确实拥有一个谓词，并且我探讨了他试图确定那个谓词是什么的努力。这一目标分三个阶段完成。首先，我从胡塞尔 1901 年的《逻辑调查》中检验了胡塞尔关于谓词和范畴直觉的标准理论. 其次，我展示了胡塞尔如何将 1901 年的见解强加于未发表的手稿和讲座中揭示存在命题的谓词。他确定存在命题是主语的谓词，它对应于一个实际的客体。这一分析表明，胡塞尔对 1890 年代后期的存在命题的描述采用了静态方法和遗传方法。在这些文本中，他仔细地解开和澄清了意识的被动和主动时刻相互交织，并表明某些情况的被动给定性是我们主动验证命题的可能性条件。最后，我对胡塞尔的思想进行了批判性评估，以表明，虽然他对存在命题的见解在很大程度上是正确的，通过在他成熟的哲学背景下重新解释它们，它们得到了增强。只有通过放弃他的形而上学中立性和解释主体间性，胡塞尔才能正确地阐明存在命题。