Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between (empirical) science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can try to understand the broader picture by looking at the empirical details. On the other side we can try to find overarching principles that explain our observations. I am deeply aware of the history of this subject but—as we all know—history repeats itself. Perhaps it is time now for, actually, deduction to take more place in science. Perhaps—which of course is my own belief—we have reached the end of the road of so much depending on empirical observations. The natural sciences have reached beyond what is possible to empirically detect. My own research is an attempt to redefine our ontological starting point and to really test if the world only is physical. In this Reply I put Tambassi’s reply in the explicit context of my definition of scientific ontology. The outcome is that scientific ontology cannot settle the debate in the geographical sciences as to whether the geographical world is mind-dependent or not, but that the geographical universe, in that case, as a universe, belongs to the domain of scientific ontology.

“科学本体论”一词的两种相反用法反映了对（经验）科学与哲学本体论之间关系的态度。一方面，我们可以通过查看经验细节来尝试了解更广泛的情况。另一方面，我们可以尝试找到解释我们观察的总体原则。我深知这个主题的历史，但众所周知，历史会重演。也许现在是时候让演绎在科学中占据更多的位置了。也许——这当然是我自己的信念——我们已经走到了如此依赖经验观察的道路的尽头。自然科学已经超出了经验检测的范围。我自己的研究试图重新定义我们的本体论起点，并真正测试世界是否只是物理的。在这篇回复中，我将坦巴西的回复放在了我对科学本体的定义的明确背景中。结果是，科学本体不能解决地理科学中关于地理世界是否依赖于心智的争论，而地理宇宙在这种情况下，作为一个宇宙，属于科学本体的范畴。