当前位置: X-MOL 学术Axiomathes › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Motion as a Concept, an Insufficient Element in the Kantian Philosophy
Axiomathes ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-16 , DOI: 10.1007/s10516-020-09508-5
Diego Emilio Salazar Gómez 1 , Francisco Luis Giraldo Gutiérrez 2
Affiliation  

This article examines the Kantian ideas on motion in his work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In that essay, Kant holds that motion as a concept—from its connotation as elemental and fundamental predicament of the material reality—mobilises in matter all the characteristics of its essence as a property. Nevertheless conceiving motion as a concept does not enable us to confirm the existence of motion itself in the natural world because ‘the possibility of specific natural things can’t be discovered from their mere concepts.’ (Kant in Principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza. Tecnos, Madrid, 7. 1991). Therefore, the concept of movement does not evidence the existence of the movement or its characteristics and properties. Such claim would imply that motion as a concept is not evidence of the existence of motion as such and, therefore, the properties of matter cannot be mobilised based on that concept because they are characteristics of the essence of motion. Then, how does Kant intend to denote motion? Why pretend to explain matter form the concept of motion if a pure concept is, by definition, independent of the data obtained from the sensibility? (Colomer in El pensamiento alemán. De Kant a Heidegger. Herder, Tomo I. Barcelona, 114. 1986). Therefore, we will demonstrate that such weakness is the breaking point of the Kantian concept of motion in his “dynamic-metaphysical” model.



中文翻译:

运动作为一个概念,康德哲学中的一个不足之处

本文考察了康德在他的著作《自然科学的形而上学基础》中关于运动的思想. 在那篇文章中,康德认为运动作为一个概念——从它作为物质现实的基本和基本困境的内涵来看——在物质中动员了它作为一种属性的本质的所有特征。然而,将运动视为一个概念并不能使我们确认运动本身在自然界中的存在,因为“特定的自然事物的可能性不能从它们的单纯概念中发现”。(康德在 Principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza. Tecnos, Madrid, 7. 1991)。因此,运动的概念并不能证明运动的存在或其特征和属性。这种主张意味着运动作为一个概念并不是运动本身存在的证据,因此,物质的属性不能基于这个概念来调动,因为它们是运动本质的特征。那么,康德打算如何表示运动呢?如果一个纯粹的概念,根据定义,独立于从感性获得的数据,为什么还要假装从运动的概念来解释物质呢?(El pensamiento alemán 中的 Colomer。De Kant a Heidegger. Herder, Tomo I. Barcelona,​​ 114. 1986)。因此,我们将证明这种弱点是康德运动概念在他的“动力学-形而上学”模型中的突破点。巴塞罗那,114. 1986)。因此,我们将证明这种弱点是康德运动概念在他的“动力学-形而上学”模型中的突破点。巴塞罗那,114. 1986)。因此,我们将证明这种弱点是康德运动概念在他的“动力学-形而上学”模型中的突破点。

更新日期:2020-09-16
down
wechat
bug