The field of enquiry into the phenomenon of language has long been dominated by the Computational-Representational (C-R) theories of language. This seems to be the most natural and plausible state of affairs, given the revolutionary impact that the advent of computers and the emergence of information technology have had in our lives lately. Noam Chomsky’s variant has been the most influential among such theories. However, there are certain conceptual issues pertaining to the very method, object and modality of the Chomskyan project. In the present paper, I will try to locate these issues and contend that they arise from the peculiar conception of human embodiment involved in the propositions forming the Chomskyan scheme of language. They come to light only when engaged closely with from a phenomenological viewpoint. And this will be done in the first part. Once this is done, I will propose an alternative approach towards language, contained in the phenomenological insights on human embodiment and perception of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau Ponty. I will also hint at how befitting this alternative scheme is to the connectionist-neural network models of language, which are fast replacing the C–R models lately.

中文翻译：

---

乔姆斯基语言理论：现象学的重新评估

长期以来，对语言现象的研究领域一直由语言的计算表示（CR）理论主导。鉴于计算机的出现和信息技术的兴起对我们的生活产生了革命性的影响，这似乎是最自然，最合理的情况。诺姆·乔姆斯基（Noam Chomsky）的变体在此类理论中最具影响力。但是，存在一些与Chomskyan项目的方法，对象和模式有关的概念性问题。在本文中，我将尝试找出这些问题，并认为它们是由人类的具体体现的概念引起的，这些概念涉及形成乔姆斯基语言方案的命题。从现象学的角度来看，它们只有紧密地结合在一起才可以被发现。这将在第一部分中完成。完成此操作后，我将提出一种替代语言的方法，该方法包含在对人类体现力和法国现象学家莫里斯·梅洛·庞蒂的感知的现象学洞见中。我还将暗示这种替代方案如何适合于语言的连接主义-神经网络模型，该模型最近正在迅速取代C-R模型。