Jeshion (New essays on singular thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b) believes that singular thought is implemented by the tokening of mental files (MFC). She also believes that an individual’s being significant to the agent is necessary and sufficient for the agent’s having singular thought about the individual (Cognitivism). Goodman (Rev Philos Psychol 7(2):437–461, 2016a, Philos Q 66:236–260, 2016b) argues that mental files created under a description lead to descriptive not singular thought. She uses this to criticize Cognitivism’s sufficiency claim and MFC. I show that this criticism rests on a faulty conception of the singular thought versus descriptive thought distinction and such files indeed lead to singular thought. This in turn shows that Cognitivism’s necessity claim is false.

中文翻译：

---

关于描述文件的奇异性

Jeshion（关于奇异思想的新文章，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2010b）认为，奇异思想是由心理文件的记号（MFC）实现的。她还认为，对于代理人而言，对于代理人而言，重要的是必要的和充分的（认知主义）。古德曼（Good Phil（Rev Philos Psychol 7（2）：437-461，2016a，Philos Q 66：236-260，2016b）认为，在描述下创建的心理档案会导致描述性而非单一思想。她以此来批评认知主义的充分性主张和MFC。我表明，这种批评建立在对单一思想与描述性思想区别的错误理解之上，而这些档案的确导致了单一思想。这反过来表明，认知主义的必要性主张是错误的。