The proponents of embodied cognition often try to present their research program as the next step in the evolution of standard cognitive science. The domain of standard cognitive science is fairly clearly circumscribed (perception, memory, attention, language, problem solving, learning). Its ontological commitments, that is, its commitments to various theoretical entities, are overt: cognition involves algorithmic processes upon symbolic representations. As a research program, embodied cognition exhibits much greater latitude in subject matter, ontological commitment, and methodology than does standard cognitive science. The proponents of embodied cognition to explain the aspects of human cognition are using the importance of embodied interaction with the environment, which is a dynamic relation. The cause of disagreement between these two approaches is regarding the role assumed by the notion of representation. The discussion about the contrast between embodied cognition and standard cognitive science is incomplete without Gibson’s ecological theory of perception and connectionist account of cognition. I will briefly contrast these important theories with computational view of cognition, highlighting the debate over role of representation. Embodied cognition has incorporated rather extensively a variety of insights emerging from research both in ecological psychology and in connectionism. The way I have followed to contrast embodied cognition with standard cognitive science, involves concentration on those several themes that appear to be prominent in the body of work that is often seen as illustrative of embodied cognition. This strategy has the advantage of postponing hard questions about “the” subject matter, ontological commitments, and methods of embodied cognition until more is understood about the particular interests and goals that embodied cognition theorists often pursue. This approach might show embodied cognition to be poorly unified, suggesting that the embodied cognition label should be abandoned in favor of several labels that reflect more accurately the distinct projects that have been clumped together under a single title. Alternatively, it might show that, in fact, there are some overarching commitments that bring tighter unity to the various bodies of work within embodied cognition that seem thematically only loosely related. The contrast between these two approaches is highlighted not only the basis of a priori argument but major experiments have been mentioned, to show the weight of the assumptions of both the contrasting approaches.

中文翻译：

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体验式认知与标准认知科学的对比：心理表征的一个视角

体现认知的拥护者经常试图提出他们的研究计划，作为标准认知科学发展的下一步。标准认知科学的领域相当清楚地界定（感知，记忆，注意力，语言，问题解决，学习）。它的本体论承诺，即它对各种理论实体的承诺是公开的：认知涉及符号表示的算法过程。作为一项研究计划，与标准的认知科学相比，体现的认知在主题，本体论承诺和方法论方面展现出更大的自由度。体现性认知的支持者解释了人类认知的各个方面，都在利用体现性与环境互动的重要性，这是一种动态关系。两种方法之间存在分歧的原因在于代表概念所承担的角色。没有吉布森的生态感知理论和认知的联系主义论，关于体现的认知与标准认知科学之间对比的讨论是不完整的。我将简要地将这些重要理论与认知的计算观点进行对比，重点介绍关于表征作用的争论。体现的认知已经相当广泛地吸收了从生态心理学和连接主义研究中得出的各种见解。我所采取的将体现认知与标准认知科学进行对比的方法，是集中精力研究似乎在作品主体中突出的几个主题，这些主题通常被视为对体现认知的说明。这种策略的优点是，可以推迟对“主题”，本体论承诺和体现认知方法的难题，直到更多地了解体现认知理论家经常追求的特殊兴趣和目标。此方法可能表明体现的认知统一性很差，建议应放弃体现的认知标签，而应使用多个标签，这些标签可以更准确地反映已归为一个标题的不同项目。或者，它可能表明，实际上，存在一些总体承诺，这些承诺在具体化的认知范围内为各个工作机构带来了更紧密的统一性，这些主题似乎在主题上松散相关。