Underdetermination of theory choice claims that empirical evidence fails to provide sufficient grounds for choosing a theory over its rivals. We explore the epistemological and methodological significance of this thesis by utilising a classificatory scheme to situate three arguments that purport to establish its plausibility. Proponents of these three arguments, W.V.O Quine, John Earman, and Kyle Stanford, use different premises to arrive at the conclusion that theory choice is empirically underdetermined and their classification along the proposed schema brings out the variety in underdetermination arguments and the historical trajectory of the thesis. Although the epistemological significance of underdetermination—it is seen as undermining the doctrine of scientific realism—is widely discussed in the literature, Quine understood the acceptance of the thesis as interrogating the attitude one is justified in adopting towards rival theories. We argue that sticking with one’s own theory in the face of underdetermination leads to a distinct type of disagreement, which we present as the methodological significance of underdetermination. The examination of the methodological significance of underdetermination allows us to propose weak underdetermination as a philosophically interesting variant of underdetermination.

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不确定性论证的合理性和意义

对理论选择的不确定性认为，经验证据不能为选择理论提供足够的依据。我们通过使用分类方案来提出旨在证明其合理性的三个论点，来探讨本文的认识论和方法论意义。WVO Quine，John Earman和Kyle Stanford这三个论点的支持者使用不同的前提得出这样的结论：理论选择是凭经验确定的，并且沿着提议的方案对它们进行分类会带来不确定性论据的多样性和历史轨迹。论文。尽管不确定性的认识论意义（被视为破坏了科学现实主义的思想）在文献中已得到广泛讨论，奎因认为接受这一论点是在质疑人们对敌对理论的接受态度。我们认为，面对不确定性坚持自己的理论会导致不同类型的分歧，我们认为这是不确定性的方法论意义。对确定不足的方法学意义的考察使我们可以提出弱确定不足作为确定不足的哲学上的变体。