Many people think that if you're uncertain about which moral theory is correct, you ought to maximize the expected choice-worthiness of your actions. This idea presupposes that the strengths of our moral reasons are comparable across theories – for instance, that our reasons to create new people, according to total utilitarianism, can be stronger than our reasons to benefit an existing person, according to a person-affecting view. But how can we make sense of such comparisons? In this article, I introduce a constructivist account of intertheoretic comparisons. On this account, such comparisons don't hold independently of facts about morally uncertain agents. They're simply the result of an ideal deliberation in terms of certain epistemic norms about what you ought to do in light of your uncertainty. If I'm right, this account is metaphysically more parsimonious than some existing proposals, and yet has plausible and strong implications.

中文翻译：

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关于理论间比较的建构主义

许多人认为，如果你不确定哪种道德理论是正确的，你应该最大化你行为的预期选择价值。这个想法的前提是，我们的道德理由的力量在各个理论中是可比较的——例如，根据完全功利主义，我们创造新人的理由可能比我们为现有人受益的理由更强大，根据影响人的观点. 但是我们如何才能理解这样的比较呢？在本文中，我介绍了一种关于理论间比较的建构主义解释。因此，这种比较并不独立于道德上不确定的代理人的事实。它们只是根据某些认知规范进行理想审议的结果，即鉴于您的不确定性，您应该做什么。如果我是对的，