This article considers two different ways of formulating a desire-satisfaction theory of prudential value. The first version of the theory (the object view) assigns basic prudential value to the state of affairs that is the object of a person's desire. The second version (the combo view) assigns basic prudential value to the compound state of affairs in which (a) a person desires some state of affairs and (b) this state of affairs obtains. My aims in this article are twofold. First, I aim to highlight that these are not mere notational variants, but in fact have quite different implications, so that this distinction is not one that the theorist of prudential value should ignore. More positively, I argue that the object view is better able to capture what is distinctive and appealing about subjective theories of prudential value, on any plausible account of what the central subjectivist insight is.

中文翻译：

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审慎价值欲望-满足理论的两种解释

本文考虑了制定审慎价值的欲望满足理论的两种不同方式。该理论的第一个版本（对象观点）将基本的审慎价值赋予作为一个人的欲望对象的事态。第二个版本（组合视图）将基本审慎价值赋予复合事态，其中（a）一个人想要某种事态，（b）这种事态获得。我在这篇文章中的目的是双重的。首先，我的目的是强调这些不仅仅是符号变体，而是实际上具有完全不同的含义，因此这种区别不是审慎价值理论家应该忽略的区别。更积极地说，我认为对象观点能够更好地捕捉审慎价值的主观理论的独特之处和吸引力，