WHY does the present generation have an environmental obligation concerning distant future generations? And does this obligation restrict the scope of legitimate procreation such as to avoid an overcrowded world? I address these questions by drawing on the claim that adults have a fundamental interest in rearing children that they can adequately parent, an interest which under normal conditions generates a right to parent. This right—as recently defended by several contemporary philosophers—could be interpreted either as a negative right, protecting potential adequate parents from interference with attempts to engage in parenting, or as a positive right, entitling potential adequate parents to active support such as assisted reproduction. Even if there is no entitlement to assisted reproduction, the right—I will argue—generates requirements on others that they preserve sufficient environmental resources to ensure adequate life prospects for the resulting children; therefore, it cannot be purely negative. While it is not beyond dispute, this right may be the best justification of the universal practice of allowing an individual to parent a child even when better prospective parents for that particular child are available and willing to replace the existing parent. The argument, in a nutshell, is:

中文翻译：

---

为人父母的权利和后代的责任

为什么当代人对遥远的后代负有环境义务？这项义务是否限制了合法生育的范围，以避免出现一个人满为患的世界？我通过提出以下主张来解决这些问题：成年人在抚养他们可以充分为人父母的孩子方面具有根本利益，这种利益在正常情况下会产生为人父母的权利。这项权利——正如最近由几位当代哲学家所捍卫的——可以被解释为一种消极权利，保护潜在的足够父母免受试图从事养育工作的干扰，或者作为一项积极权利，使潜在的足够父母有权获得积极的支持，例如辅助生殖. 即使没有辅助生殖的权利，权利——我会争辩——要求他人保护足够的环境资源，以确保由此产生的孩子有足够的生活前景；因此，它不能完全是负面的。尽管并非无可争议，但这项权利可能是允许个人为孩子抚养孩子的普遍做法的最佳理由，即使该特定孩子有更好的准父母并愿意取代现有父母。简而言之，论证是：这项权利可能是允许个人为孩子抚养孩子的普遍做法的最佳理由，即使该特定孩子有更好的准父母并愿意取代现有父母。简而言之，论证是：这项权利可能是允许个人为孩子抚养孩子的普遍做法的最佳理由，即使该特定孩子有更好的准父母并愿意取代现有父母。简而言之，论证是：