Why do states adopt binding and enforceable democracy clauses at the regional level, thereby permitting neighboring states to monitor and potentially sanction their breaches of democracy? To answer this question, the authors test a set of hypotheses in two South American intergovernmental regional organizations,MERCOSURandUNASUR. Following the epistemological and methodological requirements of process-tracing analysis, the authors conducted thirty-six interviews with top-level policymakers and decision makers who were responsible for the design and enforcement of the Protocol of Ushuaia (MERCOSUR), the Protocol of Montevideo (MERCOSUR), and the Protocol of Georgetown (UNASUR). The authors argue that actors formalize these provisions in response to threats to regime survival. Unlike international organizations for the protection of human rights, which rely on the delegation of power to institutions such as supra-state courts, democracy clauses are intergovernmental instruments whose enforcement relies on states’ capabilities. Because of this, the perceptions of governments regarding their own stability and their expectations regarding the future enforcement of the clauses against their own country are causally linked to the decision to support the adoption of the clauses. Thus, governments that perceive themselves as stable democracies or expect that they are too big to be sanctioned support the adoption of democracy clauses because these clauses are functional for others. Conversely, governments that perceive themselves as unstable democracies support the adoption of democracy clauses as functional for themselves. The authors contend that any such asymmetry of self-perceptions and expectations, together with regime protection, explain the move toward the formalization of clauses for the protection of democracy in member states withinMERCOSURandUNASUR.

中文翻译：

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地方组织民主保护中的教养与政权生存

为什么各国在地区层面采用具有约束力和可执行的民主条款，从而允许邻国监督并可能制裁其违反民主的行为？为了回答这个问题，作者在两个南美政府间区域组织中测试了一组假设，南方共同市场和乌纳苏尔. 根据过程追踪分析的认识论和方法论要求，作者对负责设计和执行乌斯怀亚议定书的高层决策者和决策者进行了 36 次访谈。南方共同市场), 蒙得维的亚议定书 (南方共同市场) 和乔治城议定书 (乌纳苏尔）。作者认为，行为者将这些规定正式化是为了应对政权生存面临的威胁。与国际人权保护组织依赖于向超国家法院等机构下放权力不同，民主条款是政府间文书，其执行依赖于国家的能力。正因为如此，政府对其自身稳定性的看法以及他们对未来对本国执行这些条款的期望与支持通过这些条款的决定有因果关系。因此，认为自己是稳定的民主国家或期望他们太大而无法被制裁的政府支持采用民主条款，因为这些条款对其他人有用。反过来，认为自己是不稳定的民主国家的政府支持通过民主条款对自己有效。作者认为，任何这种自我认知和期望的不对称，以及政权保护，都解释了在成员国中保护民主的条款正式化的趋势。南方共同市场和乌纳苏尔.