Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? The author argues that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders, who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against, insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intraregime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. The findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival.

中文翻译：

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镇压策略

镇压策略在法外和司法极端之间差异很大，从不受限制的暴力行为到高度例行化的法律程序。虽然前者受到了学术界的极大关注，但司法方法的研究相对较少。统治者何时以及为何在法庭上压制他们的对手？作者认为，独裁者在面对来自统治精英内部的挑战者时，会使用一种镇压的司法策略。与构成共同的外部威胁的政权局外人不同，内部人提出了一个更具分裂性的目标。当独裁者面对后者时，司法策略使惩罚合法化，威慑未来的对手，并就在位力量和挑战者的弱点产生共同的信念。使用撒哈拉以南非洲后殖民时期政治犯的原始数据，作者发现，独裁者更有可能对内部人员使用司法策略，对外部人员使用法外策略。肯尼亚的案例研究追溯了该理论的逻辑，展示了政权内部冲突如何使法院成为国家镇压的宝贵工具。调查结果表明法院如何在独裁生存中发挥核心作用。