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Strategies of Repression
World Politics ( IF 4.5 ) Pub Date : 2018-06-01 , DOI: 10.1017/s0043887118000047
Fiona Shen-Bayh

Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? The author argues that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders, who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against, insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intraregime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. The findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival.

中文翻译:

镇压策略

镇压策略在法外和司法极端之间差异很大,从不受限制的暴力行为到高度例行化的法律程序。虽然前者受到了学术界的极大关注,但司法方法的研究相对较少。统治者何时以及为何在法庭上压制他们的对手?作者认为,独裁者在面对来自统治精英内部的挑战者时,会使用一种镇压的司法策略。与构成共同的外部威胁的政权局外人不同,内部人提出了一个更具分裂性的目标。当独裁者面对后者时,司法策略使惩罚合法化,威慑未来的对手,并就在位力量和挑战者的弱点产生共同的信念。使用撒哈拉以南非洲后殖民时期政治犯的原始数据,作者发现,独裁者更有可能对内部人员使用司法策略,对外部人员使用法外策略。肯尼亚的案例研究追溯了该理论的逻辑,展示了政权内部冲突如何使法院成为国家镇压的宝贵工具。调查结果表明法院如何在独裁生存中发挥核心作用。
更新日期:2018-06-01
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