There is a growing consensus that status concerns drive state behavior. Although recent attention has been paid to when states are most likely to act on behalf of status concerns, very little is known about which actions states are most likely to engage in when their status is threatened. This article focuses on the effect of publicly humiliating international events as sources of status threat. Such events call into question a state's image in the eyes of others, thereby increasing the likelihood that the state will engage in reassertions of its status. The article presents a theory of status reassertion that outlines which states will be most likely to respond, as well as when and how they will be most likely to do so. The author argues that because high-status states have the most to lose from repeated humiliation, they will be relatively risk averse when reasserting their status. In contrast to prior work arguing that humiliation drives a need for revenge, the author demonstrates that great powers only rarely engage in direct revenge. Rather, they pursue the less risky option of projecting power abroad against weaker states to convey their intentions of remaining a great power. The validity of this theory is tested using an expanded and recoded data set of territorial change from 1816 to 2000. Great powers that have experienced a humiliating, involuntary territorial loss are more likely to attempt aggressive territorial gains in the future and, in particular, against third-party states.

中文翻译：

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羞辱和第三方攻击

越来越多的共识是，地位问题驱动国家行为。尽管最近人们关注国家何时最有可能代表地位问题采取行动，但对于国家在其地位受到威胁时最有可能采取哪些行动知之甚少。本文重点关注公开羞辱国际事件作为地位威胁来源的影响。此类事件使国家在其他人眼中的形象受到质疑，从而增加了国家重新确立其地位的可能性。这篇文章提出了一种地位重申理论，它概述了哪些国家最有可能做出回应，以及它们最有可能做出回应的时间和方式。作者认为，由于地位高的国家在反复屈辱中损失最大，在重申自己的地位时，他们会相对规避风险。与之前认为屈辱驱使报复需要的工作相比，作者证明大国很少进行直接报复。相反，他们追求风险较小的选择，将力量投射到国外对抗较弱的国家，以传达他们保持大国地位的意图。使用 1816 年至 2000 年领土变化的扩展和重新编码数据集测试了这一理论的有效性。经历过羞辱性、非自愿领土损失的大国更有可能在未来尝试侵略性领土扩张，尤其是反对第三方国家。作者表明，大国很少进行直接报复。相反，他们追求风险较小的选择，将力量投射到国外对抗较弱的国家，以传达他们保持大国地位的意图。使用 1816 年至 2000 年领土变化的扩展和重新编码数据集测试了这一理论的有效性。经历过羞辱性、非自愿领土损失的大国更有可能在未来尝试侵略性领土扩张，尤其是反对第三方国家。作者表明，大国很少进行直接报复。相反，他们追求风险较小的选择，将力量投射到国外对抗较弱的国家，以传达他们保持大国地位的意图。使用 1816 年至 2000 年领土变化的扩展和重新编码数据集测试了这一理论的有效性。经历过羞辱性、非自愿领土损失的大国更有可能在未来尝试侵略性领土扩张，尤其是反对第三方国家。