This article introduces a Thematic Section and theorizes the multiple ways that judicializing international relations shifts power away from national executives and legislatures toward litigants, judges, arbitrators, and other nonstate decision-makers. We identify two preconditions for judicialization to occur—(1) delegation to an adjudicatory body charged with applying designated legal rules, and (2) legal rights-claiming by actors who bring—or threaten to bring—a complaint to one or more of these bodies. We classify the adjudicatory bodies that do and do not contribute to judicializing international relations, including but not limited to international courts. We then explain how rights-claiming initiates a process for authoritatively determining past violations of the law, identifying remedies for those violations, and preventing future violations. Because judicializing international relations occurs in multiple phases, in multiple locations, and involves multiple actors as decision-makers, governments often do not control the timing, nature, or extent to which political and policy decisions are adjudicated. Delegation—and the associated choice of institutional design features—is thus only the first step in a chain of processes that determine how a diverse array of nonstate actors influence politically consequential decisions.

中文翻译：

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国际关系司法化理论化

本文介绍了一个主题部分，并对使国际关系司法化将权力从国家行政机关和立法机关转移到诉讼人，法官，仲裁员和其他非国家决策者的多种方式进行了理论化。我们确定了司法化的两个先决条件：（1）委派给负责采用指定法律规则的审判机构，（2）对其中一个或多个申诉提出或威胁提出申诉的行为者主张合法权利身体。我们对有助于和不有助于将国际关系司法化的审判机构进行分类，包括但不限于国际法院。然后，我们将解释权利主张如何启动一个程序，以权威地确定过去的违法行为，并为这些违法行为确定补救措施，并防止将来的侵权行为。由于将国际关系司法化的过程在多个阶段，在多个地点发生，并且涉及多个行为者作为决策者，因此政府通常不控制判决政治和政策决策的时机，性质或程度。因此，授权（以及相关的机构设计特征选择）只是一系列过程中的第一步，这些过程确定了各种各样的非国家行为者如何影响政治上相应的决定。