Concerns over disinformation have intensified in recent years. Policymakers, pundits, and observers worry that countries like Russia are spreading false narratives and disseminating rumours in order to shape international opinion and, by extension, government policies to their liking. Despite the importance of this topic, mainstream theories in International Relations offer contradictory guidance on how to think about disinformation. I argue that disinformation is ineffective in terms of changing the policies of a target as regards to its foreign policy alignments and armaments – that is, the balance of power. To be strategically effective, disinformation must somehow overcome three powerful obstacles: first, the fundamental uncertainty that international anarchy generates over any information broadcasted by adversaries; second, the pre-existing prejudices of foreign policy elites and ordinary citizens; and third, the countermeasures that are available even amid political polarisation. I examine the most likely case of there seemingly being a conscious and effective strategy that emphasises disinformation: the Russian campaign that has targeted the Baltic states, especially since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The available evidence strongly suggests that the strategic effects of disinformation are exaggerated.

中文翻译：

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国际政治中的虚假信息

近年来，对虚假信息的担忧愈演愈烈。政策制定者、权威人士和观察家担心，像俄罗斯这样的国家正在散布虚假叙述和散布谣言，以塑造国际舆论，进而塑造他们喜欢的政府政策。尽管这个话题很重要，但国际关系中的主流理论在如何思考虚假信息方面提供了相互矛盾的指导。我认为，就改变目标的外交政策调整和军备（即力量平衡）而言，虚假信息是无效的。为了在战略上有效，虚假信息必须以某种方式克服三个强大的障碍：第一，国际无政府状态对对手广播的任何信息产生的根本不确定性；第二，外交政策精英和普通公民预先存在的偏见；第三，即使在政治两极分化的情况下也可以采取的对策。我研究了似乎存在一种强调虚假信息的有意识和有效战略的最有可能的案例：俄罗斯针对波罗的海国家的运动，尤其是自 2014 年吞并克里米亚以来。现有证据强烈表明虚假信息的战略影响被夸大了。特别是自 2014 年吞并克里米亚以来。现有证据强烈表明虚假信息的战略影响被夸大了。特别是自 2014 年吞并克里米亚以来。现有证据强烈表明虚假信息的战略影响被夸大了。