This article examines how two dynamics, one global and one domestic, have interacted to shape the politics of banking in Europe. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, European governments were subject to renewed structural incentive to promote TBTF banks: in financialized economies, the growth of these banks is perceived as an essential element of a national economy's global competitiveness. Yet, this incentive was subject to enhanced political contention at home. Factions—often led by actors from within the state itself—have opposed governments’ impetus to promote TBTF banks. The specific identity, preferences and resources of these factions are determined by distinctive political institutions and vary across countries. Through the comparative analysis of banking structural reform and banking competition policies in the UK, France and Germany, I argue that varieties of regulatory outcomes are explained by the differentiated institutional capacity of “anti-TBTF” factions to carry weight in policymaking processes across jurisdictions.

中文翻译：

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银行、权力和政治机构：欧洲国家对“大而不能倒”银行的不同优先事项：零售银行竞争案例和银行结构改革

本文探讨了两种动态，一种是全球的，一种是国内的，如何相互作用以塑造欧洲银行业的政治。在 2008 年危机之后，欧洲政府受到新的结构性激励以促进 TBTF 银行：在金融化经济体中，这些银行的增长被视为国民经济全球竞争力的基本要素。然而，这种激励措施受到国内政治争论的加剧。派系——通常由国家内部的行动者领导——反对政府推动 TBTF 银行的推动。这些派系的具体身份、偏好和资源由独特的政治制度决定，并且因国家而异。通过对英国、法国和德国银行业结构性改革和银行业竞争政策的比较分析，