Following the financial crisis, the United Kingdom introduced major structural reforms to address concern about Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks, while France and Germany adopted much weaker reforms. This is puzzling given the presence of large universal banks engaged in market making activities in all three countries, which suffered significant losses during the international financial crisis, and given the commitments to reform made by political leaders in all three countries. The paper explains this policy divergence by analysing how dynamics of agenda setting contributed to the emergence of policy windows on structural reform. We explain the United Kingdom's decision to delegate the process to an independent commission as an example of venue shifting which helped to insulate the process from industry framing, and resulted in “conflict expansion” by mobilizing a wider coalition of actors in support of bank ringfencing. By contrast, in France and Germany the agenda was tightly managed through existing institutional venues, enabling industry to resist the framing of the issue around TBTF and limiting the role of non-business groups—a process we label as “conflict contraction.” We argue that analysis of agenda setting dynamics provides new insights into the cross-national variability of business power.

中文翻译：

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银行结构改革的政治：英国、法国和德国的商业权力和议程设置

金融危机之后，英国进行了重大的结构性改革，以解决对“大到不能倒”（TBTF）银行​​的担忧，而法国和德国则采取了较弱的改革。鉴于在国际金融危机期间遭受重大损失的所有三个国家都存在从事做市活动的大型全能银行，并且鉴于所有三个国家的政治领导人都承诺进行改革，这令人费解。本文通过分析议程设置的动态如何促成结构性改革政策窗口的出现来解释这种政策分歧。我们解释了英国决定将该过程委托给一个独立委员会作为地点转移的一个例子，这有助于使该过程免受行业框架的影响，并通过动员更广泛的行动者联盟支持银行围栏而导致“冲突扩大”。相比之下，在法国和德国，议程通过现有的机构场所得到严格管理，使行业能够抵制围绕 TBTF 构建问题并限制非商业团体的作用——我们将这一过程称为“冲突收缩”。我们认为，议程设置动态分析为商业权力的跨国可变性提供了新的见解。