This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.

中文翻译：

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考虑绿色和服务努力的最优联盟战略及其对闭环供应链的影响

本文根据由制造商，零售商和第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链（CLSC）中的不同联盟策略来处理Stackelberg游戏模型。在此CLSC中，检查了四个方案：分散案例，制造商和零售商组成联盟，制造商和第三方回收商组成联盟以及集中式案例。在这些Stackelberg游戏模型中，通过考虑绿色和服务努力来分析四种联盟策略之间的比较。还研究了联盟战略对CLSC系统，消费者，环境和社会的决策的影响。主要目的是找出最佳价格，绿色程度，和服务方面的努力，通过使用理论分析来最大化CLSC成员的利润并给出最佳联盟策略。发现联盟战略提高了CLSC的运营效率，也使消费者，环境和社会受益。MR联盟策略比MT联盟策略更有效，但是它无法实现集中式方案的效率。最后，通过算例说明了所提出模型在现实中的可行性和实用性。