A key source of competitive advantage for large firms accrues from investments in innovative products and processes by their suppliers, incentivized by a positive relationship climate. A fundamental hindrance lies in a condition that commonly characterizes buyer-supplier relationships: asymmetric levels of dependence between business partners. Such asymmetry has been shown to be detrimental to the relationship, enhancing the likelihood of conflict, and negatively impacting the performance of the more dependent party. Considering that such dependence asymmetry is likely to persist, large buyers face the challenge of promoting a relationship environment that provides an incentive for suppliers to invest in innovation. In this study, we propose that large, dominant buyers can influence suppliers' intentions and behaviors by mitigating the effects of their perceived riskiness and ambiguity that emerge from a situation of dependence asymmetry. Specifically, using the lens of resource dependence theory, we investigate the effects of these two psychological dimensions of uncertainty on a supplier's trust, commitment, and willingness to invest in innovation, as well as the moderating effect of a buyer's information sharing in shaping a supplier's perceived uncertainty. The model is tested with a scenario-based experiment and results are corroborated by interviews with experienced managers of retail suppliers. Our findings indicate that a supplier's dependence on a large buyer increases its perception of ambiguity and riskiness in the relationship, negatively impacting its trust, commitment, and willingness to invest in innovation. However, a buyer who shares relevant and timely information with the supplier mitigates its perceived uncertainty, promoting the supplier's positive attitudes towards the buyer and incentivizing innovation. Sharing operational and strategic information such as point-of-sales data, sales forecasts, or strategic plans, becomes a valuable strategy to powerful buyers in the pursuit of becoming a preferred customer and enhancing a supplier's resource mobilization towards the relationship.

大企业竞争优势的关键来源来自其供应商对创新产品和流程的投资，并受到积极的合作关系氛围的激励。根本障碍在于通常表征买卖双方关系的情况：商业伙伴之间的依赖程度不对称。事实证明，这种不对称不利于这种关系，增加了冲突的可能性，并对更依赖一方的表现产生了负面影响。考虑到这种依赖关系的不对称可能会持续存在，大型购买者面临着促进建立关系环境的挑战，这种关系环境会激励供应商进行创新投资。在这项研究中，我们建议，大型的，占主导地位的买家可以影响供应商的 通过减轻依赖不对称情况下出现的风险和歧义的影响来消除意图和行为。具体来说，使用资源依赖理论的视角，我们研究了不确定性的这两个心理维度对供应商的信任，承诺和投资创新的意愿的影响，以及买方信息共享对塑造供应商的信任的调节作用。感知的不确定性。该模型已通过基于场景的实验进行了测试，并通过与零售供应商经验丰富的经理进行访谈来证实结果。我们的调查结果表明，供应商对大买家的依赖增加了其对关系中含糊不清和风险性的认识，从而对其信任，承诺，并愿意投资于创新。但是，与供应商共享相关及时信息的买方可以减轻其感知的不确定性，从而提高了供应商对买方的积极态度并激励了创新。共享销售点数据，销售预测或战略计划之类的运营和战略信息，对于寻求成为首选客户并增强供应商对关系的资源动员而言，对于强大的购买者而言，成为一项有价值的战略。