We study the effect of quantity and quality of environmental disclosure of a corporation, and also assess the impact of government intervention through subsidies on the corporation. Both positive and negative information levels and respective subsidies, and three different government policies (i.e., environmental policy, disclosure benefit policy, and social welfare policy) are considered. The resulting interaction between the government and the corporation is modeled in a game theoretic framework, which is then solved to find equilibrium decisions and to develop insights. It was concluded that offering both positive and negative disclosure subsidy benefits both parties than when the government does not intervene. Furthermore, given high positive and negative disclosure cost, the corporation would prefer that the government adopt a pure environmental policy, however, the latter would prefer the social welfare policy. Finally, under environmental policy, the corporation benefits more when the sensitivity to negative disclosure level to environmental factor is less, however, both parties benefit under the two other policies.

我们研究了公司环境披露的数量和质量的影响，并评估了政府通过补贴对公司的干预的影响。正面和负面的信息水平和相应的补贴，以及三种不同的政府政策（即环境政策，信息披露福利政策和社会福利政策）都应予以考虑。在博弈论框架中对政府与公司之间的互动进行建模，然后对博弈论框架进行求解，以找到均衡决策并发展见识。得出的结论是，与政府不干预时相比，提供正面和负面的公开补贴对双方都有利。此外，鉴于正面和负面的披露成本很高，公司希望政府采用纯环境政策，而后者希望社会福利政策。最后，在环境政策下，当公司对环境因素的负面披露水平的敏感性降低时，公司会受益更多，但是，在其他两项政策下，双方都将从中受益。