A substantial body of literature suggests that politicians are blocked from implementing efficient reforms that solve substantial problems because of special interest groups or budget constraints. Despite the existing mechanisms that block potentially efficient reforms, real-world data show that a large number of new programs and policies are implemented every year in developed countries. These policies are often selective and considered to be fairly inefficient by ex post evaluation, and they tend to be small in size and scope. With this background, this paper studies the reasons why a rational politician would implement an inefficient public policy that is intended to obfuscate the difficulties in achieving reforms. The paper uses a simple competence signaling model that suggests that if an effective reform is impossible, engaging in strategic obfuscation through an inefficient program increases the probability of winning a re-election compared to doing nothing at all. This is because an inefficient reform does not lead voters to believe that the politician is incompetent, which a lack of action risks doing. Intentional inefficiency aiming to obfuscate the difficulty of efficient reforms can therefore complement the previous theories’ explanations of political failure.

中文翻译：

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忙于无所事事：为什么政客实施低效政策

大量文献表明，由于特殊利益集团或预算限制，政治家无法实施有效的改革以解决实质性问题。尽管现有机制阻碍了潜在的有效改革，但现实世界的数据表明，发达国家每年都会实施大量新计划和政策。这些政策通常是有选择性的，事后评估认为效率相当低，而且它们的规模和范围往往很小。在此背景下，本文研究理性政治家为何会实施低效的公共政策，以掩盖实现改革的困难。该论文使用了一个简单的能力信号模型，表明如果不可能进行有效的改革，与什么都不做相比，通过低效的计划进行战略混淆会增加赢得连任的可能性。这是因为低效的改革不会让选民相信政治家无能，而缺乏行动可能会导致这种情况。因此，旨在模糊有效改革难度的故意低效率可以补充先前理论对政治失败的解释。