Abstract Despite research on R&D and innovation policies, the effect of constitutional rules in this area has not received adequate attention yet. The paper contributes to filling this research gap by proposing that electoral systems affect governments’ decisions regarding R&D spending. It is expected that investment in R&D is closer to a bounded public good than to transfer payment. Therefore, governments in countries with majoritarian electoral rules should be willing to use this instrument to influence election outcomes. Both the amount invested and structure of funding is expected to depend on whether a government is elected via proportional or majoritarian rules. The analysis covers 25 OECD countries between 1981 and 2014, and relies on panel data analysis. The findings suggest that governments elected under majoritarian rules project higher government budget appropriations or outlays for research and development (GBAORD) than governments elected under proportional rules. Furthermore, GBAORD is more fragmented thematically in countries with proportional electoral rules.

中文翻译：

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不同选举规则下的公共研发：来自经合组织国家的证据

摘要 尽管对研发和创新政策进行了研究，但宪法规则在该领域的作用尚未得到足够的重视。该论文通过提出选举制度影响政府关于研发支出的决策来填补这一研究空白。预计研发投资比转移支付更接近于有界公共产品。因此，实行多数选举规则的国家的政府应该愿意使用这种工具来影响选举结果。预计投资金额和资金结构都取决于政府是通过比例规则还是多数规则选出的。该分析涵盖了 1981 年至 2014 年间的 25 个经合组织国家，并依赖于面板数据分析。调查结果表明，各国政府在牧马规则方面选出的政府更高的政府预算拨款或研究和发展支出（GBAORD），而不是在比例规则下所选的政府。此外，在具有比例选举规则的国家，GBAORD 在主题上更加分散。