The current paper is heavily indebted to Steven Pinker’s theory of Leviathan. He made ingenious theoretical and historical use of the one-off prisoner’s dilemma game (= the pacifist’s dilemma game) and demonstrated how the state, as one of the most important institutions for controlling violence, solves the Hobbesian problem of anarchy. We argue, however, that centralized authoritarian solutions to the pacifist’s dilemma game continue to suffer from a few, specifiable problems that cause political violence, and citizens’ violence against one another, and that decentralized cooperative solutions to the pacifist’s dilemma game, arising from iterated solution concepts, are capable of solving these particular problems. A decentralized cooperative solution to the pacifist’s dilemma game, without the sovereign, is not only a feasible, but, also, under certain conditions, an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. There are several theoretical constructs that have reached essentially the same conclusion. These include the Folk Theorem by Robert Aumann, the theory of reciprocal altruism by Robert Trivers, and the strategic simulations and models of the evolution of cooperation by Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton. Constitutional democracy, based on citizens’ equal political rights and on the rule of law, incorporates some of the key logical components of the above-mentioned models of decentralized cooperation. It is not a perfect system of government, as such, but it does solve some of the key problems of political violence and instability that have plagued centralized authoritarian systems of government. The paper thus provides a new theoretical outlook upon the pacifying effects of constitutional democracy.

中文翻译：

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迭代和平主义者困境博弈的去中心化合作解决方案：平克利维坦理论边缘注释

目前的论文在很大程度上归功于史蒂文·平克的利维坦理论。他对一次性囚徒困境博弈（=和平主义者的困境博弈）进行了巧妙的理论和历史运用，并展示了作为控制暴力的最重要机构之一的国家如何解决霍布斯式的无政府状态问题。然而，我们认为，和平主义者困境博弈的集中式威权解决方案继续受到一些特定问题的困扰，这些问题导致政治暴力和公民相互暴力，而和平主义者困境博弈的分散合作解决方案源于迭代解决方案概念，能够解决这些特定问题。和平主义者困境博弈的去中心化合作解决方案，没有主权者，不仅是可行的，而且，在某些条件下，进化稳定的平衡。有几个理论结构已经得出了基本相同的结论。其中包括罗伯特·奥曼的民间定理、罗伯特·特里弗斯的互惠利他主义理论，以及罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德和威廉·D·汉密尔顿的合作演化战略模拟和模型。基于公民平等的政治权利和法治的宪政民主融合了上述分散合作模式的一些关键逻辑组成部分。因此，它不是一个完美的政府体系，但它确实解决了困扰中央集权政府体系的一些政治暴力和不稳定的关键问题。