Interest groups ‘caught’ influencing public policy solely for private gain risk public backlash. These risks can be diminished, and rent seeking efforts made more successful, when moral or social arguments are employed in pushing for changes to public policy. Following Yandle’s Bootlegger and Baptist model, we postulate this risk differential should manifest itself in regulatory output with social regulations being more responsive to political influence than economic regulations. We test, and confirm, our theory using data on economic and social regulations from the new RegData project matched with data on campaign contributions and lobbying activity at the industry level.

中文翻译：

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盗版者、浸信会和寻租的风险

利益集团“抓住”影响公共政策的唯一目的是为了私人利益，可能会引起公众强烈反对。当道德或社会论据被用来推动公共政策的改变时，这些风险可以被减少，并且寻租的努力会更加成功。遵循 Yandle 的 Bootlegger 和 Baptist 模型，我们假设这种风险差异应该体现在监管输出中，社会监管对政治影响的反应比经济监管更敏感。我们使用来自新 RegData 项目的经济和社会法规数据与行业层面的竞选捐款和游说活动数据相匹配，测试并证实了我们的理论。