Prior research presents mixed results for electoral impact on economic performance, thereby raising the question of whether electoral systems matter economically at all. We argue that electoral systems can conceivably generate a robust economic impact at the firm level. This argument is grounded in a recent scholarship on the political economy of corporate governance. Analysts discern electoral systems as a significant determinant of a country’s corporate governance regime and its two central components: investor and employment protection. Building on a wealth of research relating investor and employment protection to firms’ economic behavior, we develop the hypothesis that firm performance is stronger under plurality-majoritarian rules than under proportional rules. Our panel study of firms in 21 advanced democracies from 1989 to 2007 supports our hypothesis. Overall, this research helps to fill in an important gap in understanding of why it matters to choose one electoral system over another.

中文翻译：

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选举制度和经济：公司层面的分析

先前的研究显示了选举对经济表现的影响的混合结果，从而提出了选举制度在经济上是否重要的​​问题。我们认为，选举制度可以在公司层面产生强大的经济影响。这个论点是基于最近关于公司治理的政治经济学的学术研究。分析家认为选举制度是一个国家公司治理制度及其两个核心组成部分的重要决定因素：投资者和就业保护。基于将投资者和就业保护与公司经济行为相关的大量研究，我们提出假设，即在多元化多数规则下的公司绩效比在比例规则下更强。我们对 1989 年至 2007 年 21 个先进民主国家公司的小组研究支持了我们的假设。总体而言，这项研究有助于填补在理解为什么选择一种选举制度而不是另一种选举制度很重要方面的一个重要空白。