This article is a contribution to a symposium on Kit Wellman’s intriguing monograph, Rights Forfeiture and Punishment (Oxford University Press 2017). Primarily, the article grapples with Wellman’s claims regarding the moral permissibility of sadistic punishment. The metaphor of “philosophical languages” is employed throughout, to compare (translate) Wellman’s use of rights-forfeiture discourse to an approach that is grounded in practical-reasons discourse. This study in philosophical translation allows us to reassess and critique Wellman’s conclusions regarding the moral permissibility of sadistic punishment. On one level, the article is an attempt to engage with Wellman’s book and rights-forfeiture based arguments on, and in, their own terms. Yet, the article is also an attempt to explain and defend a practical-reasons based approach to appraising moral permissibility. If the article succeeds, it both pays tribute to Wellman’s masterful rights-forfeiture arguments, while making the case that practical-reason arguments illuminate a wider range of salient considerations that we should wish to keep in view when considering the moral permissibility of sadistic punishments.

中文翻译：

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惩罚的原因：哲学翻译研究（或者，为什么道德上不能禁止虐待狂惩罚）

本文是关于基特·韦尔曼（Kit Wellman）有趣的专着《权利没收与惩罚》（Oxford University Press 2017）座谈会的贡献。文章主要是针对威尔曼关于虐待狂惩罚的道德允许性的主张。贯穿全文使用“哲学语言”的隐喻，以比较（转换）威尔曼对权利没收话语的使用和基于实际原因话语的方法。这项哲学翻译研究使我们可以重新评估和批评韦尔曼关于虐待狂惩罚的道德容许性的结论。在一个层面上，本文试图与威尔曼的书和没收权利有关的论据进行对接，并以此为依据。然而，本文也是试图解释和捍卫一种基于实践理由的方法来评估道德允许性。如果这篇文章获得成功，那么这两者都将对威尔曼的精湛的权利没收论点表示敬意，同时也提出了实践理性的论点阐明了更广泛的重要考虑，我们在考虑虐待主义惩罚的道德容许性时应谨记这一点。