A monist theory of explanation is one that seeks a common definition for all speech acts answering why-questions. One recent example is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE), which assumes that an ideal explanation can be characterized by the familiar Hempelian criteria for a scientific explanation plus a certain counterfactual that is supported by the laws mentioned in the explanans. I show that the CTE fails. My discussion leads to a critique of the CTE’s key concept of counterfactual dependence and to the suggestion of an alternative: For an argument to be a scientific explanation, a certain necessary-condition claim must be true. For an answer to a why-question to be an explanation, it must express a certain necessary condition.

中文翻译：

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走向一元解释理论

一元论的解释理论是为所有回答为什么问题的言语行为寻求一个共同定义。最近的一个例子是反事实解释理论 (CTE)，它假设理想的解释可以通过熟悉的 Hempelian 科学解释标准加上解释中提到的定律支持的某种反事实来表征。我证明 CTE 失败了。我的讨论导致了对 CTE 的反事实依赖的关键概念的批评，并提出了替代方案的建议：要使论证成为科学解释，某个必要条件声明必须为真。对于一个为什么问题的回答要成为一种解释，它必须表达某种必要条件。