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Identical Quantum Particles as Distinguishable Objects
Journal for General Philosophy of Science ( IF 1.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-24 , DOI: 10.1007/s10838-020-09510-w
Dennis Dieks , Andrea Lubberdink

According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity.



中文翻译:

相同的量子粒子作为可区分的对象

根据经典物理粒子是世界的基本组成部分。这些经典粒子是可区分的对象,由物理特性的独特组合来区分。相比之下,在量子力学中,公认的观点是同类粒子(“相同粒子”)在物理上彼此无法区分并且缺乏同一性。该学说基于量子力学(反)对称化假设以及“因子”假设,即每个单个粒子恰好表示在多粒子系统的张量积希尔伯特空间的一个因子空间中。尽管在理论物理学和物理学哲学中是标准的,但因式分解的假设和随之而来的粒子不可区分性是有问题的。粒子不可区分性与“粒子”的日常含义是不可调和的,以及该术语在物理实践中的使用方式。此外,标准观点的结果是,即使在经典极限下,相同的量子粒子仍然无法区分,这使得平滑过渡到经典粒子概念是不可能的。Lubberdink (1998; 2009) 和 Dieks 和 Lubberdink (2011) 提出了一种不依赖因式分解并避免这些困难的量子粒子的替代概念。我们在这里进一步解释和讨论这个替代框架。其关键后果之一是量子理论中的粒子不是基本的,而是 这使得向经典粒子概念的平滑过渡变得不可能。Lubberdink (1998; 2009) 和 Dieks 和 Lubberdink (2011) 提出了一种不依赖因式分解并避免这些困难的量子粒子的替代概念。我们在这里进一步解释和讨论这个替代框架。其关键后果之一是量子理论中的粒子不是基本的,而是 这使得向经典粒子概念的平滑过渡变得不可能。Lubberdink (1998; 2009) 和 Dieks 和 Lubberdink (2011) 提出了一种不依赖因式分解并避免这些困难的量子粒子的替代概念。我们在这里进一步解释和讨论这个替代框架。其关键后果之一是量子理论中的粒子不是基本的,而是涌现;另一种说法是,一旦它们出现,量子粒子总是在物理上是可区分的,因此具有物理基础的身份。

更新日期:2020-06-24
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