The aim of this paper is to debunk the assertion that miraculous “conspiracies” between fundamental particles are required to bring about the projectibility of special science generalisations. Albert and Loewer have proposed a theory of lawhood which supplements the Best System of fundamental laws with a statistical postulate over the initial conditions of the universe, thereby rendering special science generalisations highly probable, and dispelling the conspiracy. However, concerns have been raised about its ability to confer typicality upon special science generalisations in the way that is required. In this paper I defend their account against these charges, arguing that they derive from a misunderstanding of the typicality claim. I suggest a way out of the impasse via a naturalised approach which focusses on the genealogy of subsystems and encourages conceptual demonstrations of typicality for special science generalisations. I argue for an account of special science laws that acknowledges the way in which the special sciences reduce to the fundamental physics, thereby dissolving the conspiracy, yet respects the methodological and explanatory autonomy of special science generalisations.

中文翻译：

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粒子不会合谋

本文的目的是驳斥这样一种说法，即基本粒子之间的奇迹般的“阴谋”是导致特殊科学概括的可投射性所必需的。Albert 和 Loewer 提出了一种定律理论，该理论用对宇宙初始条件的统计假设补充了最佳基本定律体系，从而使特殊科学概括的可能性很大，并消除了阴谋。然而，人们对其以所需方式赋予特殊科学概括典型性的能力表示担忧。在本文中，我针对这些指控为他们的说法辩护，认为这些指控源于对典型性主张的误解。我建议通过一种自然化的方法来摆脱僵局，该方法侧重于子系统的谱系学，并鼓励对特殊科学概括的典型性进行概念论证。我主张对特殊科学定律的解释，承认特殊科学归结为基础物理学的方式，从而解散了阴谋，但尊重特殊科学概括的方法论和解释自主性。