The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time; that is, a “specious present.” I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally.

对知觉错觉的哲学研究可以在主观时间意识的研究中产生富有成效的见解。然而，解释幻觉的方式往往是有争议的。最近，所谓的动态快照理论的支持者诉诸瀑布错觉，一种运动后遗症，以支持一种特定的时间意识观点，根据这种观点，经验被构造为一系列具有动态特性的瞬时快照。这种动态性旨在解释时间现象学的熟悉特征，例如连续性、连续性和变化。先前的理论通常诉诸于占据时间间隔的主观现在；也就是说，一个“似是而非的礼物”。我认为，通过对运动后遗症幻觉和动眼症的罕见情况的分析，即 运动失明，即瀑布错觉未能按预期支持动态快照理论。此外，我建议未来的主观时间理论应该将时间现象学视为与一般意识背后的机制密切相关的非本地化过程的结果。