This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference and with standard revealed preference methodology. And it does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference theory.

中文翻译：

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为显示偏好理论辩护

本文为揭示偏好理论辩护，反对普遍的批评，根据这种批评，揭示偏好方法依赖于诉诸一些心理状态，特别是代理人的信念，从而使项目变得不连贯或没有动机。我认为，这些论点所建立的一切是，显示偏好理论家在他们对代理人应该被建模为在其之间进行选择的选项的解释中必须接受一种有限的唯心主义。这与偏好的基本行为解释和标准的显示偏好方法一致。它并没有破坏显示偏好理论的核心动机。