According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a colour primitivist cannot accept that an object's being scarlet grounds its not being chartreuse. The Finean might try to defend these implications, but it generates further problems. Instead, the principle should be rejected. An important upshot is that the principle cannot be relied on to distinguish robust realism from anti-realism about a propositional domain, for the principle obscures ways of taking features to be both real and fundamental.

中文翻译：

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实地作为现实主义指南

根据 Fine（以及其他人）的说法，非基本事实命题必须以涉及其构成要素的事实为基础，这些事实既真实又基本。但该原则容易受到几个辩证地重要反例的影响。例如，逻辑柏拉图主义者不能接受真正的析取基于它们的析取的真理；一个关于数学对象的柏拉图主义者不能接受集合以其成员为基础；并且色彩原始主义者不能接受一个物体是猩红色的，因为它不是黄绿色。Finean 可能会试图捍卫这些含义，但它会产生更多的问题。相反，应该拒绝该原则。