Metaphysical functionalism holds that the nature of the mental is its functional role. Proponents of the absent qualia objection to functionalism assert that mental states with essential phenomenal qualities might have had functional duplicates without qualia. Michael Tye has argued that this purported possibility is incoherent. Robert van Gulick has criticized Tye's argument. It is contended here that although van Gulick's criticism does not refute the argument, Tye's argument is unsuccessful. It is also contended that our evidence very strongly supports the possibility of absent qualia.

中文翻译：

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为缺席的 Qualia 异议辩护

形而上学功能主义认为精神的本质就是它的功能作用。反对功能主义的缺席感受性的支持者断言，具有基本现象品质的心理状态可能在没有感受性的情况下具有功能重复。Michael Tye 认为这种所谓的可能性是不连贯的。罗伯特范古利克批评了泰伊的论点。此处争辩说，虽然范古利克的批评没有反驳这个论点，但泰伊的论点是不成功的。也有人认为，我们的证据非常有力地支持了缺乏感受质的可能性。