I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of the objections levelled against moderate subjectivism but can be shown to yield inconsistent results in some cases. Both subjectivisms should be rejected. We should be objectivists regarding undercutting defeat. This requirement, however, is likely to be problematic for a popular interpretation of evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics as it can be shown that existing objectivist accounts of defeat do not support such arguments. I end by discussing the constraints of developing such an account.

中文翻译：

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失败的客观条件和进化论驳斥论点

我提出了一个理由，明确区分削弱失败的主观和客观解释，并拒绝接受主观和客观因素都与信念是否被击败相关的混合观点。温和的主观主义者声称，相信被打败就足以让信念被打败；主观唯心主义者补充说，如果理想化的代理人认为信念会被打败，那么信念就会被打败。主观唯心主义回避了一些反对温和主观主义的反对意见，但在某些情况下可能会产生不一致的结果。两种主观主义都应该被拒绝。我们应该是客观主义者关于削弱失败。不过这个要求，对于元伦理学中进化揭穿论点的流行解释，这可能是有问题的，因为可以证明现有的客观主义失败论不支持这种论点。我最后讨论了开发这样一个帐户的限制。