Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.

中文翻译：

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幸运成就：关于知识价值的美德认识论

美德认识论认为知识比葛梯级信念更有价值，因为知识是一种成就，但葛梯梯信念不是。成就论的关键前提是成就是恰当的（成功是因为有能力），而盖梯化的信念是不恰当的（成功是因为幸运）。我首先认为成就论背后的直觉错误地基于这样一个事实，即“因为幸运而成功”意味着“不够胜任”。然后我提出了一个来自道德运气的论点，认为美德认识论者应该坚持知识并不比盖蒂尔化的信念更有价值。